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UNMUDDYING THE WATERS:
EVALUATING THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE 
HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER UNDER TREATY 
LAW, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
AND THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Ndjodi Ndeunyema∗
I. Introduction
Water scarcity, insecurity, and inequality are increasingly recognized as 
universal concerns.
1
The annual World Economic Forum’s Global Risk 
Report
2
has identified water crises as among the top five risks facing the 
planet for eight consecutive years. Water crises remain entrenched among a 
cluster of other risks that are rated as having both a very high likelihood and 
a very high impact. Access to water is therefore more than just a concern for 
the Global South and developing countries; it is a universal challenge for all 
states, including the Global North and developed countries. Accordingly, 
Goal 6 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals challenges 
states to “ensure availability and sustainable management of water . . . for 
all” by 2020,
3
while appreciating that water challenges manifest differently 
in different geographies and situations.
In this context, it is unsurprising that legal arguments that assert a 
binding right to water in both the domestic and international spheres have
garnered significant attention. This article continues in that vein, assessing 
* DPhil in Law Candidate (University of Oxford); MPhil in Law, BCL, MSc 
Criminology (University of Oxford); LLB, B.Juris (University of Namibia). This article was 
initially presented as a conference paper at Michigan Law’s Fifth Annual Junior Scholars 
Conference in 2019, and the author is grateful to the Conference participants for their helpful 
feedback. This article has also benefited immensely from the input of Sandy Fredman and 
colleagues from the Human Rights Research Group at Oxford University, namely Jason 
Brickhill, Rishika Sahgal, Max Harris, Victoria Miyandazi, Meghan Campbell, Nomfundo 
Ramalekana, Tristan Cummings, Gauri Pillai, Richard Martin, Andrew Byrnes and Helen 
Taylor, as well as Maria Gwynn, Gita Keshava, and Dunia Zongwe. The author can be 
contacted at ndjodi@gmail.com.
1. Illustratively, in 2017, water scarcity already affected four out of every ten people, 
while 2.1 billion people lacked access to safely managed drinking water services. See Water,
UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/water (last visited May 9, 
2019).
2. World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report, at 5 (14th ed. 2009), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2019.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 
2019). 
3. Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UNITED 
NATIONS, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg6 (last visited Apr. 20, 2019).
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the existence of a legally binding right to water (that is, a human right to 
access to clean and potable
4
water for personal and domestic use) by 
drawing on each of the three principal sources of international law: treaties, 
customary international law (“CIL”), and the general principles of law.
In Part II, I argue that the right has largely already been recognized in 
international human rights treaty law, even if only implicitly. First, through 
adoption of its 2002 General Comment 15, the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights implied the right to water into article 
11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
5
although there is some scholarly disagreement as to the normative suitability 
of creating an implied right. Second, other treaties contain express right to 
water provisions, although these treaties are of limited applicability, as they 
have fewer contracting parties and are designed to only extend to specific 
categories of protected people.
Part III considers an alternative approach: The right to water as a matter 
of customary international law. This approach is appealing as norms of 
customary international law bind all states, including states that are not 
parties to those limited-purpose treaties that explicitly incorporate a right to 
water. Further, as CIL, the right to water could be asserted by states in 
investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) contexts where water-related 
investments have harmed local access to water. Unfortunately, even though 
political bodies of the UN, particularly the UN General Assembly 
(“UNGA”) in its 2010 Resolution 64/292, have “recognised” the right to 
water, establishing the crystallization of the right as a CIL norm is 
challenging. While there is strong evidence of opinio juris, evidence of state 
practice is sparser. Consequently, this article assesses the presence of CIL in 
support of a right to water under two different methodologies—the “sliding
scale approach” and the “reflective equilibrium approach”—and finds the 
evidence of state practice inadequate to support a new CIL norm.
Part IV then evaluates whether the right to water has become part of the 
corpus of binding international law through “the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations” and finds that there is no independent legal 
basis for the right to water as a matter of general principle. Part V concludes 
the article.
4. See Potable, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2017) (defining potable as “fit or 
suitable for drinking”).  
5. UN Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment 15: The Right to Water (arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), ¶¶ 3–4, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002); see also Human Rights Council, Rep. of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the Scope and Content of the Relevant Human Rights 
Obligations Related to Equitable Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation Under 
International Human Rights Instruments, ¶ (e), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/3 (Aug. 16, 2007); 
Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights 
Obligations Related to Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Catarina de 
Albuquerque, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/31 (June 29, 2010).
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II. Evaluating a Treaty-based Right to Water
International civil society and intergovernmental organizations have 
advocated for a universal convention specifically dedicated to the right to 
clean water for over a decade.
6
However, at this time, there exists no 
independent, issue-specific treaty that proclaims an express, circumstance-
independent right to water from a strictly anthropocentric perspective, and 
that outlines the right’s normative content; and determines the obligations of 
States Parties in respect to the right. For our purposes, an express right to 
water is to be understood as one that is textually specified in a treaty 
instrument. The existence of an express treaty-based right to water in 
limited circumstances is discussed below in sections A and B. This is in 
contrast with an implied or derivative right to water under treaty law, which 
will be addressed in sections C and D of this part.
A. An Express Right to Water for Children, Women, Persons with 
Disabilities, and Certain Persons in Armed Conflicts
Various international treaties have expressly recognized a right to water 
as part of their range of human rights guarantees. Regional treaties also 
offer a potentially solid basis for water as a human right. The most 
prominent international treaties that expressly recognize a right to water are 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”),
7
the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD”),
8
the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (“CEDAW”),
9
and the Geneva Conventions.
10
Regional treaties that 
expresly recognize the right include the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child
11
(“African Children’s Rights Charter”) and the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa (the “Maputo Protocol”).
12
All of these 
6. See Statement by Green Cross International, U.S. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
PLATFORM (Apr. 21, 2005), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=
view&type=255&nr=2158&menu=35.
7. Convention on the Rights of a Child art. 24, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CRC].
8. Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 28, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRPD].
9. Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 
14, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
10. See infra notes 36–37.
11. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art. 14, July 11, 1990, 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 [hereinafter African Children’s Rights Charter].
12. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa art. 15, July 11, 2003, African Union Assembly, Decision on the Draft 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights Relating to Women, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.19 (III), https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-african-charter-human-and-
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instruments are limited in scope, as they apply only to specific categories of 
individuals or groups. People who do not fall within one of the categories 
protected by a given treaty are not able to claim the rights it guarantees. 
These group-based treaties are nevertheless salient to the examination of 
whether a universal right to water exists and are thus assessed herein.
Beginning with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRC 
article 24(1) recognizes the child’s right to enjoy “the highest attainable 
standard of health” and medical facilities, requiring States Parties to “strive
to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such health 
care services.” Article 24(2) proceeds to list categories of measures that 
States Parties “shall take”—as “appropriate”—to fully implement article 
24(1), including measures “[t]o combat disease and malnutrition, including 
within the framework of primary health care[,] through, inter alia, . . . the 
provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water[.]”13
But while the CRC creates an obligation for states to provide clean 
drinking water, that obligation is limited to the context of the child’s right to 
the enjoyment of health.
14
That is, the right that accompanies states’ 
obligations may only be claimed by children—human beings below the age 
of eighteen.
15
Additionally, it is arguable that the provision of water is only 
obligatory under the CRC insofar as water is the nexus to realize the health 
of the child. Indeed, scholars who have analyzed the CRC’s travaux 
préparatoires affirm this interpretation of article 24 by pointing out that 
India proposed the introduction of the expression “clean drinking water” in 
recognition of its importance for avoiding serious disease and even death in 
children.
16
However, while it is clearly understood that water is indispensable to 
the basic health of a child (or any person), there is reason to believe the 
CRC’s right to water might extend even farther. Water is, after all, critical to 
health in many senses and what constitutes health can be broadly defined. 
This is a proposition that finds interpretive support in the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child’s General Comment 15 which points to water’s 
essentiality both in the prevention of water-related diseases and, more 
broadly, to life and other human rights.
17
peoples-rights-rights-women-africa [hereinafter Maputo Protocol on the Rights of Women in 
Africa].
13. CRC, supra note 7, art. 24 (emphasis added). 
14. See id. art. 24(1). The child’s right to water can also be implied from the child’s
right to an adequate standard of living in CRC article 27.
15. See id. art. 1.
16. JIMENA CHÁVARRO, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: A LEGAL COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE AT THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEVEL 59 (2014); 
SHARON DETRICK, A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS 
OF THE CHILD 405, 409 (1999).
17. UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment 15 (2013) on the Right of 
the Child to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (art. 24), ¶ 48, U.N. 
Doc. CRC/C/GC/15 (Apr. 17, 2013), providing that:
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A similar regional expression of an explicit right to water as a 
derivative of the right to health can be found in article 14(2)(c) of the 
African Children’s Rights Charter.
18
The African Children’s Rights Charter 
adopts language and structure similar to the CRC’s, although the African 
Children’s Rights Charter refers to safe drinking water as opposed to the 
CRC’s clean drinking water.19
Treaties addressing women’s rights also expressly affirm the existence 
of the right to water, albeit in a limited context. The UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women provides rural
women with a right to water as part of their right to participate in and 
benefit from rural development.
20
Articles 14(1) and (2) of CEDAW detail 
the unique challenges that rural women—who represent a quarter of the 
world’s population
21
—face both in ensuring the economic survival of their 
families and in contributing non-monetized work to their communities and 
households.
22
In response to this problem, CEDAW requires States Parties 
Safe and clean drinking water and sanitation are essential for the full enjoyment of 
life and all other human rights. Government departments and local authorities 
responsible for water and sanitation should recognize their obligation to help realize 
children’s right to health, and actively consider child indicators on malnutrition, 
diarrhoea and other water related diseases and household size when planning and 
carrying out infrastructure expansion and the maintenance of water services, and 
when making decisions on amounts for free minimum allocation and service 
disconnections. States are not exempted from their obligations, even when they 
have privatized water and sanitation.
18. See African Children’s Rights Charter, supra note 11, art. 14 (“(1) Every child shall 
have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health. (2) 
State Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to pursue the full implementation of this 
right and in particular shall take measures: . . . (c) to ensure the provision of adequate nutrition 
and safe drinking water . . . .” (emphasis added); see also HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS:
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S FOREIGN POLICY 51 (1980); SANDRA FREDMAN,
HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS AND POSITIVE DUTIES 69 (2008).
19. Compare African Children’s Rights Charter, supra note 11, art. 14, with CRC, 
supra note 7, art. 24(2).
20. CEDAW Comm, Gen. Recommendation No. 34 on Rural Women, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/GC/34 (Mar. 7, 2016).
21. See id. ¶ 3.
22. CEDAW art. 14(1) and (2): 
(1) States Parties shall take into account the particular problems faced by rural 
women and the significant roles which rural women play in the economic 
survival of their families, including their work in the non-monetized sectors of 
the economy, and shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the application 
of the provisions of the present Convention to women in rural areas.
(2) States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men 
and women, that they participate in and benefit from rural development and, 
in particular, shall ensure to such women the right:
. . . .
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to “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination” against rural 
women by “ensur[ing] such women the right” to “enjoy adequate living 
conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and 
water supply, transport and communications.”23 Article 14 of CEDAW thus 
engenders the right to water as an intersectionality concern,
24
by coupling 
gender with socio-economic class, given the article’s specific application to 
women who are rurally located.
25
The specific protection of rural women under article 14 is based on data 
showing that rural women fare worse than (1) rural men and (2) both urban
women and men on every socio-economic indicator.
26
Article 14 thus seeks 
to ensure that rural women benefit directly from social security programs 
and have adequate living conditions, including adequate access to water.
27
As with the right to water under the CDC, scholars also advance a 
“holistic” understanding of article 14
28
that is supported by the CEDAW 
Committee’s General Recommendation 34 asserting that “[r]ural women’s 
and girls’ rights to water and sanitation are not only essential rights in 
themselves, but also are key to the realization of a wide range of other 
rights, including rights to health, food, education and participation.”
29
(h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, 
sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and communications.
23. See id. art. 14(2)(h) (emphasis added). 
24. On intersectionality, see Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing The Intersection of 
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory 
and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. L.F. 139, 139–67 (1989); Sandra Fredman, Engendering 
Socio-Economic Rights, in WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS: CEDAW IN INTERNATIONAL,
REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW 218 (Anne Hellum & Henriette Sinding Aasen eds., 2013).
25. For an intersectional perspective, anchored in Southern and Eastern African case 
studies, on women’s right to water considering “intersecting and overlapping marginalizations 
on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, political exclusion, and social economic class,” see 
WATER IS LIFE: WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL AND LOCAL WATER GOVERNMENT 
IN SOUTHERN AND EASTERN AFRICA (Anne Hellum et al. eds., 2015).
26. See CEDAW Comm., Gen. Recommendation No. 34 on Rural Women, supra note 
20, ¶ 5. This is a particularly pertinent concern in the Sub-Saharan African context where 40 
billion hours are spent collecting water every year, with women bearing two-thirds of the 
burden. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/media/
media_45481.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2020); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-
Comm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Final Report of the El Hadji 
Guisse (Special Rapporteur), Relationship Between the Enjoyment of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights and the Promotion of the Realization of the Right to Drinking Water Supply 
and Sanitation, ¶¶ 18–19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/20 (July 14, 2004), 
https://www.cetim.ch/legacy/en/documents/rap-2004-20-ang.pdf.
27. See generally MEGHAN CAMPBELL, WOMEN, POVERTY, EQUALITY: THE ROLE OF 
CEDAW (2018).
28. Anne Hellum, Engendering the Right to Water and Sanitation, in THE HUMAN 
RIGHT TO WATER THEORY, PRACTICE AND PROSPECTS 300, 316–17 (Malcolm Langford &
Anna Russell eds., 2017).
29. See CEDAW Comm., supra note 20, ¶ 81.
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Similarly, the Maputo Protocol recognizes the rights of African women 
to food security, with a duty upon States Parties to “ensure that women have 
the right to nutritious and adequate food.” States are consequently required 
to take “appropriate” measures to “provide women with access to clean 
drinking water,” per article 15(a).
30
Like CEDAW, the Maputo Protocol’s 
scope of application is limited to women and girls, and its scope is further 
limited to African women and girls.
31
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities also 
expressly provides for the right to water. Through article 28(2)(a), CRPD 
States Parties “recognize the rights of persons with disabilities to social 
protection,” and agree to take “appropriate steps” to “ensure [their] equal 
access . . . to clean water services.”
32
This same requirement has been 
affirmed by the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
33
As with the other treaties discussed in this section, the scope of application 
for the CRPD is limited; this time to the protected group of persons with 
disabilities.
34
The right to water under treaties pertaining to international
humanitarian law, which is the body of international law that specifically 
finds application during international or non-international armed conflicts,
35
30. The Maputo Protocol’s article 15 reads:
States Parties shall ensure that women have the right to nutritious and adequate 
food. In this regard, they shall take appropriate measures to: 
(a) provide women with access to clean drinking water, sources of domestic 
fuel, land, and the means of producing nutritious food.
Maputo Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, supra note 12, art. 15.
31. See id., art. 1. 
32. Article 28 of the CPRD reads, in relevant part: 
2. States Parties recognize the right of persons with disabilities to social 
protection and to the enjoyment of that right without discrimination on the 
basis of disability, and shall take appropriate steps to safeguard and promote 
the realization of this right, including measures: 
(a) To ensure equal access by persons with disabilities to clean water 
services, and to ensure access to appropriate and affordable services, 
devices and other assistance for disability-related needs[.]
CRPD, supra note 8, art. 28.
33. UN Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Guidelines on Treaty-
Specific Document to be Submitted by States Parties Under Article 35, Paragraph 1, of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, at 16, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/2/3 (Nov. 
18, 2009) (averring that, with regard to article 28, States Parties should report on “[m]easures 
taken to ensure availability and access by persons with disabilities to clean water, adequate 
food, clothing and housing and provide examples”). The Committee was established under 
article 34 of the CRPD with the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the CRPD.
34. CRPD, supra note 8, art. 1. 
35. See generally Dapo Akande, Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012); Dieter Fleck, The Law of 
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also merits some analysis. While water can be implicated at the level of both 
jus ad bellum (as a source of armed conflict in water-related conflict 
situations) and jus in bello (with regard to the provision of water during 
armed conflicts), it is through the latter that international humanitarian law 
offers potential as a source of water-related rights and obligations upon 
states. The Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions,
36
treaty instruments that 
largely also reflect customary international humanitarian law, contain 
provisions that protect access to water in armed conflict-related situations 
for persons such as prisoners of war, internees, and civilians, thereby 
creating water-related rights and obligations that bind parties participating 
in hostilities.
37
B. Limitations of Existing Express Treaty-Based Rights to Water
Many of the treaties assessed above are limited scope, ratione personae
treaties that apply only to specific categories of groups or individuals. These 
treaties thus do not offer a general, free-standing right to water. In fact, they 
often formulate the right to water as a derivative of another “principal” or 
“core” right, whether it is the right to health (in the CRC), to social 
protection (in the CRPD), or to adequate living conditions (in the CEDAW).
The “ill-defined status” of the right, as scholar Amanda Cahill frames it, 
“causes confusion as to the scope and core content of the right to water.”
38
That confusion raises problems concerning the right’s justiciability and 
implementation, presenting the challenge of establishing “whether 
violations are of the right to water itself or, first and foremost, violations of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 581 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2013); Christine Byron, Armed Conflicts: International or Non-
International?, 6 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 63 (2001).
36. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(IV Geneva Convention) arts. 85, 89, 127, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (III Geneva Convention) arts. 20, 
26, 29, 46, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
37. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 
36, at 99, 102–03, 109 (guaranteeing sufficient water for drinking purposes and other human 
needs); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
supra note 36, at 197–98, 213 (mentioning water and the protection of civilian persons in 
times of war); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 54, June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (prohibiting the attacking, destroying, removing or rendering “useless objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population” including “drinking water installations 
and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their 
sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party”); see also LAURENCE 
BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, FRESH WATER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 169–73 (2013); cf.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) arts. 5, 14, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
38. Amanda Cahill, The Human Right to Water––A Right of Unique Status: The Legal 
Status and Normative Content of the Right to Water, 9 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 389, 391 (2005). 
2020] Unmuddying the Waters 463
other related rights.”
39
Cahill thus illuminates the challenge of cogently 
asserting that a right to water, as formulated in one of the treaties above, 
has, as a matter of law, been violated.
40
In the context of international humanitarian law, scholar Inga Winkler 
has argued that if water-related guarantees exist even in the strenuous 
context of armed conflicts, where significant derogations from various 
human rights protections are often permitted, then they must continue in 
times of peace when there would ordinarily be no “military necessity” 
justification for restricting human rights.
41
While Winkler’s deductive 
reasoning may be attractive, it is in apparent contradiction with the Geneva 
Conventions’ facial ratione materiae (armed conflict) and ratione personae
(prisoners of war, internees, and civilians) limitations.
Ultimately, all of the treaties assessed to this point referencing an 
express right to water are insufficient to establish a universal human right to 
water as well as to determine the right’s content and correlated duties upon 
states.
42
They apply only to rural women, children, persons with disabilities, 
or certain persons in armed conflicts, as the case may be, although the 
application of water-related rights and obligations may sometimes also 
extend to the dependents and families of persons within those categories. 
While the “vulnerability-based” approach to the right to water taken by 
these treaties is laudable,
43
this article focuses on evaluating the existence of 
a general human right to water. By delimiting the instances in which a 
treaty-based right to water is expressly present, these treaties actually 
suggest that an express, treaty-based human right to water does not yet exist. 
Nevertheless, these treaties may serve as modest evaluative and deliberative 
resources in determining the normative scope and substantive content of a 
future, express human right to water—or even an implied human right to 
water.
What follows, therefore, is a consideration of treaty law sources that 
may assert the existence of a right to water, if only implied, that is not 
subject to ratione materiae or ratione personae limitations.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. INGA WINKLER, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: SIGNIFICANCE, LEGAL STATUS 
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR WATER ALLOCATION 62 (2012). 
42. A human right is a right that is of general application to all human beings by virtue 
of the biological status of their humanity alone.  
43. The vulnerability-based approach has even been adopted into broader international 
agendas. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, Goal 6.2 (Sept. 25, 2015) (setting out in Target 6.2 of the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals to “achieve access to adequate and equitable 
sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of 
women and girls and those in vulnerable situations”).
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C. A Universal Implied Right to Water
Two international treaties potentially support an implied right to water: 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”).
44
This article argues that these treaties support an implied right 
to water that is of general application, relying on judicial, quasi-judicial, and 
soft law sources as interpretive aids.
1. Implying the Right to Water Under the ICESCR
Support for a right to water under the ICESCR finds textual anchorage 
in two provisions: articles 11(1) and 12.
45
Article 11(1) of the ICESCR 
reads:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his 
family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties 
will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, 
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international 
co-operation based on free consent.
46
While article 11(1) does not refer to water explicitly, the UN Economic 
and Social Council’s Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(the “CESCR” or the “Committee”)
47
has repeatedly interpreted this 
provision as including a right to water as part of the individual’s right to an 
44. Cf. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, art. 10(2), May 21, 1997, 2999 U.N.T.S. (requiring special regard be given to 
“the requirements of vital human needs” in the event of a conflict between uses of an 
international watercourse).
45. See Cahill, supra note 38, at 390. Cahill also points out that article 1(2) of ICESCR 
provides that “in no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence” and 
argues that means of subsistence must include water. Id. at 391.
46. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR] art. 
11(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasis added); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, 
Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12: The Right to Adequate 
Food, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999) (interpreting the right to adequate food as 
applying to “everyone” without any limitation upon the applicability of this right to 
individuals or to female headed households despite the ICESCR’s gendered reference to 
“himself and his family”).
47. The Committee is a body of eighteen independent experts that is tasked with 
monitoring the implementation of the ICESCR by its States Parties and with developing 
general interpretations of the ICESCR’s provisions (called “General Comments”). It was 
established by resolution of the UN Economic and Social Council [“ECOSOC”] to carry out 
the monitoring functions assigned to ECOSOC in Part IV of the ICESCR. See U.N. OFFICE OF 
THE HIGH COMM’R, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Introduction,
http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cescr/pages/cescrindex.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
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adequate standard of living for herself and her family.
48
Essentially, the 
Committee utilized article 11(1) to carve out a free-standing right to water, 
as water is amongst the pre-requisites for an adequate standard of living.
49
The right to an adequate standard of living is thus the “source right” for the 
right to water.
50
In its most expansive analysis of the right to water, the CESCR’s 
General Comment 15 sets out its legal bases, its normative content, states’ 
obligations with regard to the right
51






obligations of non-state actors.
54
Notably, the CESCR’s discussion of 
General Comment 15 extends only to water for personal and domestic use 
and thus excludes considerations borne out of commercialization or 
transboundary concerns, for example.
55
In General Comment 15, the CESCR principally relied on three implicit 
legal justifications for reading the right to water into the ICESCR.
56
The first 
is the original intent of the ICESCR drafters, who, the Committee argued, 
used the word “including” in ICESCR article 11(1) as an indication that the 
catalogue of rights mentioned there (food, clothing, and housing) was not 
48. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment 15: The Right to Water (2002), supra note 5, (offering a full exposition of the right 
to water under the ICESCR); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural 
Rights, General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec. 
13, 1991) (recognizing, in a more limited capacity than General Comment 15, that all 
beneficiaries of the right to adequate housing have a right to sustainable access to safe 
drinking water, without elaboration on the right’s legal source or normative content). 
49. See Takele Bulto, The Emergence of the Human Right to Water in International 
Human Rights Law: Invention or Discovery?, 12 MELB. J. INT’L L. 299 (2011). 
50. Pierre Thielbörger, Re-Conceptualizing the Human Right to Water: A Pledge for 
a Hybrid Approach, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 225, 226 (2015).
51. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment 15: The Right to Water, supra note 5, ¶¶ 17–38. 
52. See id. ¶¶ 2–38.
53. See id. ¶¶ 39–44.
54. See id. ¶ 60. 
55. Id. ¶ 2. See generally Catarina de Albuquerque & Inga Winkler, Neither Friend Nor 
Foe––Why the Commercialization of Water and Sanitation Services Is Not the Main Issue for 
the Realization of Human Rights, 17 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 167 (2010); Malcolm Langford, 
Privatisation and the Right to Water, in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER THEORY, PRACTICE 
AND PROSPECTS, supra note 28, at 463; Andrew Lang, Privatisation and Regulatory 
Autonomy: The Right to Water and International Economic Law, in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO 
WATER THEORY, PRACTICE AND PROSPECTS, supra note 28, at 531 (for a discussion on the 
commercialization and privatization of water).
56. Though scholars have ascribed these three justifications to the CESCR from their 
readings of Comment 15, the CESCR itself did not frame its justifications in the exact 
language scholars have since used. The words “derivative” and “multiplier” for instance are 
nowhere to be found in Comment 15 and are the byproduct of scholarly analysis.
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intended to be exhaustive but rather exemplary.
57
The Committee’s 
understanding of the term “including” reflects a legal drafting tradition that 
is frequently adopted by domestic and international law-making organs.
58
The second justification is that water is a multiplier right.59 Water is of 
overarching salience in the realization of other rights, as without water other
rights cannot be fulfilled. As the Committee framed it, water “clearly falls 
within the category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate 
standard of living, particularly since it is one of the most fundamental 
conditions for survival.”
60
Indeed, the Committee recognized that water is 
necessary “to realise many of the [ICESCR] rights” such as adequate food, 
health and environmental hygiene, livelihood, and cultural practices.
61
The third justification relates to water as a derivative right,62 derived 
from—as opposed to contributing to—the rights to life, dignity, or health.
63
The Committee points out that water “should also be seen in conjunction 
with other rights enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights, 
57. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment 15: The Right to Water, supra note 5, ¶ 3. 
58. The interpretive inclusion of the right to water in article 11(1) is anchored in 
teleological interpretation under the primary rule of treaty interpretation contained in article 
31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the “VCLT”). See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
VCLT] (requiring that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose”); see also Bulto supra note 49 at 302.
59. Sandra Fredman, supra note 18, at 216.
60. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment 15: The Right to Water, supra note 5, ¶ 3; see also David Copp, The Right to an 
Adequate Standard of Living: Justice, Autonomy, and the Basic Needs, 9 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y
231, 252 (1992) (concluding that “[a]ny credible analysis of the concept of a basic need would 
imply . . . basic needs [such as] clean water.”); cf. WINKLER, supra note 41, 43 (highlighting 
the challenge of determining what forms the right to an adequate living under article 11(1) of 
the ICESCR while advancing Engbruch’s assumption that an adequate standard of living is 
met “when individuals live in an environment and under conditions that allow them to 
participate in social life while maintaining their dignity and to realise their rights by their own 
means”). 
61. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, Gen. 
Comment 15: The Right to Water, supra note 5, ¶ 6; see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, 
Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health (art. 12), ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000).
62. See, e.g., Cahill, supra note 38, at 391 (arguing that because water is a crucial 
element of the ICESCR’s article 11 rights to food, clothing, and housing, “the right to water 
still exists in international human rights law with a ‘unique status’––somewhere between that 
of a derivative right and an independent right”); Comm. on Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women, General Recommendation 34 (2016) on the Rights of Rural Women, ¶¶ 81–
85, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/34 (2016) (recognizing the right to water as a component of 
both the right to health and the right to housing).
63. See Chávarro, supra note 16 at 48 (finding a derivative right to water under the 
ICESCR rights to food, health, and an adequate standard of living); Erik Bluemel, The 
Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 969–70 (2005).
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foremost amongst them the right to life and human dignity.”
64
The value of 
the right to water can thus be seen as being of intrinsic value; its worth 
derives from its “inherent qualities, powers, and potentialities” and not by 
being ascribed through social conventions or subjective preferences.
65
The CESCR also found a right to water in the context of the right to 
health in ICESCR article 12.
66
This argument was advanced in detail in the 
Committee’s General Comment 14.
67
In that Comment, the Committee 
stated first that the article 12(1) right to health is “an inclusive right 
extending not only to timely and appropriate health care but also to the 
underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe and potable 
water . . .”
68
The Committee also interpreted ICESCR article 12(2)(b), 
requiring “the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial 
hygiene” to include, inter alia, a requirement “to ensure an adequate supply 
of safe and potable water and basic sanitation.”
69
The CESCR’s various justifications for the legal foundations of the 
right to water have not been without scholarly demur and criticism. The 
principal objector is Stephen Tully, who has taken issue with General 
Comment 15.
70
Tully criticizes General Comment 15 as “revisionist” and 
admonishes what he sees as the Committee’s invention of a novel right to 
water.
71
His reasoning is described below, though this article is restricted to 
addressing his legal and normative concerns and refrains from engaging 
with his policy-based considerations.
72
First, Tully disputes the Committee’s expansive reading of the word 
“including” in article 11(1) ICESCR, arguing that it is a “self-evidently 
imprecise term” that leads one to “speculate on the number and nature of 
64. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment 15: The Right to Water, supra note 5, ¶ 3 (referring presumably to the rights to life 
and dignity in the UDHR, ICESCR, ICCPR, and the Optional Protocols).
65. Michael Penn & Aditi Malik, The Protection and Development of the Human 
Spirit: An Expanded Focus for Human Rights Discourse, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 665, 667 (2010).
66. Thielbörger, supra note 50, 228–29.
67. See also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment 15: The Right to Water, supra note 5, ¶¶ 3, 8, 11–13, 44 (approaching the 
right to water from the perspective of the right to health). 
68. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, supra note 61, ¶ 11. 
69. Id. ¶ 15.
70. See generally Stephen Tully, A Human Right to Access Water? A Critique of 
General Comment No. 15, 23 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 35, 63 (2005).
71. Bulto supra note 49, at 292.
72. There is a series of relevant debates between Stephen Tully and Malcolm Langford 
on General Comment 15. See generally Malcolm Langford, Ambition That Overleaps Itself? A
Response to Stephen Tully’s Critique of the General Comment on the Right to Water,
24 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 433 (2006); Stephen Tully, Flighty Purposes and Deeds: A Rejoinder 
to Malcolm Langford, 24 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 461 (2006); Malcolm Langford, Expectation of 
Plenty: Response to Stephen Tully, 24 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 473 (2006). For Tully’s policy-
based considerations, see generally Tully, supra note 70, at 45–51.
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other characteristics essential to an adequate standard of living but not 
explicitly guaranteed by the [ICESCR].”
73
Effectively, Tully faults the 
Committee for engaging in a form of proliferation of rights.
74
To him, an 
expansive reading of the word “including” could encompass rights to 
electricity, the internet, or other civic services, “open[ing] up the floodgates 
of other less important rights.”
75
Tully does nevertheless accept an implied 
right to access water but only insofar as it is necessary to grow food or 
satisfy housing needs.
76
Tully’s second critique is that the CESCR’s inclusion of water as an 
article 11 right was outside its competence as an interpretive, non-legislative 
body. Tully argues that the ICESCR’s travaux préparatoires reveal states’ 
deliberate omission of a right to water at the drafting stage.
77
Thus, Tully 
suggests that the Committee’s recognition of water as a human right was, in 
effect, an amendment of the ICESCR. Since amending the ICESCR to add 
new rights is only possible through the amendment procedure outlined in 
ICESCR article 29,
78
Tully’s argument implies that the Committee invented
rather than discovered the right to water.79
Tully’s views were rendered in the mid-2000s, and much of the wind 
has been taken out of his revisionism objection by the passage of time. The 
global consensus—or at least the absence of express objection—to water’s 
recognition as a human right is today epitomized by the non-binding 2010 
UN General Assembly Resolution 64/292, which recognized the “right to 
safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is 
essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights.”
80
While Tully is correct that the meaning of the phrase “adequate 
standard of living” in article 11(1) ICESCR is imprecise, other scholars 
have compellingly argued that, at a minimum, an “adequate standard of 
73. Id. at 36–37. Cf. Langford, Ambition That Overleaps Itself? A Response to Stephen 
Tully’s Critique of the General Comment on the Right to Water, supra note 72.
74. See Phillip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality 
Control, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 607 (1984).
75. Tully, A Human Right to Access Water?, supra note 70, at 37; Stephen Tully, A
Human Right to Access the Internet? Problems and Prospects, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 175 
(1984).
76. Tully, A Human Right to Access Water?, supra note 70, at 36–37.
77. Tully, A Human Right to Access Water?, supra note 70, at 37 (citing generally, for 
analysis of the traveaux, P.H. Gleick, The Human Right to Water, 1 WATER POL’Y 487, 491 
(1999) (suggesting, without providing an explicit source, that “the framers of the UDHR 
considered water to be implicitly included as one of the ‘component elements’—as 
fundamental as air”)).
78. Id.
79. Cf. Bulto, supra note 49, at 298 (arguing that the water was a more of a “discovery”
than an “invention”).
80. G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶ 1 (July 28, 2010); see also id. pmbl. (recalling the General 
Assembly’s various previous resolutions on the right to development, the decade of water 
action, and the habitat agenda, amongst others, that have affirmed a human right to water).  
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living” requires an environment that allows individuals to “participate in 
social life while maintaining their dignity.”
81
Without access to water, then, 
realizing an adequate standard of living would be impossible. As for Tully’s 
concern that admitting a right to water is a slippery slope, this is more 
hypothetical than a real risk. Jenny Granwall observed that the Committee’s 
treatment of water as a pre-requisite for other rights restricts the potential 
for “any flood of new rights only because the special status of water is 
recognised.”
82
The thrust of Tully’s second critique can be neutralized through an 
examination of the ICESCR’s travaux préparatoires. Pierre Thielbörger 
compellingly argues that the ICESCR’s textual silence on water ought not to 
be interpreted as a consensus that there is not a right to water.
83
A plausible 
alternative is that the drafters’ textual omission constitutes a merely 
“negligent silence,” as water was simply forgotten, or taken for granted, at 
the time of drafting the ICESCR.
84
This theory is particularly convincing 
when considering that a global food crisis was contemporaneous to the 
ICESCR’s drafting, while drinking water was considered to be a plentiful 
and renewable natural resource.
85
The absence of a specifically elaborated 
right to water in article 11 should thus be understood as neither an 
exclusionary nor an inclusionary absence, as Takele Bulto argues, but as 
resulting simply from a lack of “cognition” or “recognition.”
86
Moreover, even assuming that the travaux préparatoires did establish 
the exclusion of water as a human right, the travaux are of only secondary 
interpretive significance under article 32 of the VCLT.
87
Since regional 
bodies, including the Inter-American Court on Human Rights in Xákmok 
Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, have accepted General 
Comment 15’s interpretation of an implied article 11 right to water, it 
appears that Tully’s understanding of the meaning and significance of the 
travaux is not universally held.88
81. WINKLER, supra note 41, at 43. 
82. JENNY GRANWALL, ACCESS TO WATER: RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND THE 
BANGALORE SITUATION 215 (2008).
83. Thielbörger, supra note 50, 227.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Bulto, supra note 49, at 303 (citing Matthew Craven, Some Thoughts on the 
Emergent Right to Water, in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER 37, 38 (Eibe Riedel & Peter 
Rothen eds., 2006). Indeed, this is largely what Gleick was saying, too. See P.H. Gleick, The 
Human Right to Water, 1 WATER POL’Y 487, 491 (1999).
87. Recourse to the travaux préparatoires is secondary in light of article 32 of VCLT, 
providing that interpretative recourse to the preparatory works would only follow where the 
primary methods in article 31 VCLT are ambiguous, obscure, or lead to a result that is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable. See VCLT, supra note 58, art. 32. 
88. Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ¶ 195 (Aug. 24, 2010). Here, it was held that the 
supply of 2.17 litres of water per person per day by the government to the indigenous 
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2. Implying the Right to Water Under the ICCPR
Like the ICESCR, the ICCPR may also be read to include an implied 
right to water. In the ICCPR, that right would be found in its article 6(1) 
guarantee of the right to life, expressed thus: “Every human being has the 
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life.”
89
The argument that the right to life implies a right to water is relatively 
banal, yet it is potent in its forcefulness: Water is a non-substitutable 
resource that is essential at the most basic level to ensure the survival and 
sustenance of human life. Lack of water is a “deprivation that threatens life, 
destroys opportunity and undermines human dignity.”
90
Whether the article 6(1) right to life includes access to water, however, 
is not cut and dry. The right to “life” in article 6(1) can arguably be 
understood in two senses. The first is in the strict and narrow sense that it 
would impose negative obligations of restraint or non-interference upon the 
state, which cannot to deprive a person of their life. The second is broader, 
requiring the state to, in addition to its negative obligations, also take
positive steps to safeguard life.
Those who believe that article 6(1) adopts the narrow approach point to 
both the text and context of the ICCPR. Yoram Dinstein, for example, has 
argued that “[t]he human right to life per se . . . is a civil right and does not 
guarantee any person against death from famine or cold or lack of medical 
attention.”
91
The ambit of ICCPR article 6, his argument goes, is confined to 
protection against the deprivation of life through means of homicide, not the 
freedom to live as one wishes or the right to have an appropriate standard of 
living.
92
Dinstein’s restrictive interpretation may be further buttressed when 
considering that the right to life is contained in the ICCPR, which 
enumerates civil and political rights, and not the ICESCR, with socio-
economic rights. This placement implies that article 6(1) ICCPR is to be 
understood only in the civil rights sense and at the exclusion of its socio-
community of Xákmok Kásek was not sufficient in quantity and of adequate quality, and had 
exposed them to risks and disease. The court described water as essential to meet “basic 
needs, including food and hygiene” while citing articles 11 and 12 of the General Comment 
15; see also CHAZOURNES, supra note 36, at 158. 
89. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] art. 6.1, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
90. UN Dev. Programme, Human Development Report––Beyond Scarcity: Power, 
Poverty and the Global Water Crisis, at 5 (2006).
91
.
Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 115
(Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
92. Id. Notably, the travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR contain comments on the right 
to life as it relates to state deprivation of an individual’s life. See MARC BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO 
THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS 115, 115–36 (1987).
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economic connotations, such as an individual’s underlying need to access 
clean drinking water.
However, this interpretation is disputed by an authoritative source. In 
1982 the UN Human Rights Committee (“UNHRC”), the ICCPR’s treaty 
body, adopted General Comment 6 on the Right to Life.
93
In General 
Comment 6, the UNHRC eschewed the narrow and restrictive interpretation 
of article 6 as vacuous.
94
Instead, according to scholar Antonio Trindade, it 
opined that a “modern and proper” construction of life should not only 
protect against any arbitrary deprivation of life but should also place states 
under a duty to “‘pursue policies which are designed to ensure access to the 
means of survival’ for all individuals and all peoples.”
95
While the 
UNHRC’s General Comment 6 did not specify that a broader reading of the 
right to life included a right to water, it did state that the protection of the 
right to life “requires that States adopt positive measures.”
96
Updating its 
analysis in 2018’s General Comment 36, the UNHRC expressly included 
access to water as a component of the right to life.
97
III. A Right to Water Under CIL?
A. The Significance of Settling the Existence of a Right to Water 
Under CIL
Like treaty law, CIL is one of the three principal sources of 
international law recognized by article 38(1)(b) of the International Court of 
93. UN Human Rights Committee [U.N. HRC], General Comment 6 art. 6 (Right to 
Life), ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Apr. 30, 1982) [hereinafter U.N. HRC General 
Comment 6].
94. See id.; Cahill, supra note 38, at 397. 
95. Antonio A. Cancado Trindade, The Parallel Evolutions of International Human 
Rights Protections and of Environmental Protection and the Absence of Restrictions on the 
Exercise of Recognized Human Rights, 13 REVISTA INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS 35, 51 (1991) (quoting B.G. Ramcharan, The Right to Life, 30 NETH.
INT’L L. REV. 301, 302 (1983). Further, the UN HRC stated that the ICCPR “should be 
interpreted as a living instrument and the rights protected under it should be applied in context 
and in the light of present-day conditions.” U.N. HRC, Comm. No. 829/1988, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (Aug. 13, 2003) (stating the ICCPR “should be interpreted as a living 
instrument and the rights protected under it should be applied in context and in the light of 
present-day conditions”).
96. U.N. HRC General Comment 6, supra note 93, ¶ 5. 
97. U.N. HRC, General Comment 36 on Article 6 (Right to Life), ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018) (“The measures called for to address adequate conditions for 
protecting the right to life include, where necessary, measures designed to ensure access 
without delay by individuals to essential goods and services such as food, water, shelter, 
health care, electricity and sanitation, and other measures designed to promote and facilitate 
adequate general conditions, such as the bolstering of effective emergency health services, 
emergency response operations (including firefighters, ambulance services and police forces) 
and social housing programmes.”) (emphasis added).
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Justice (“ICJ”) Statute.
98
Whether or not a treaty-based right to CIL exists, it 
is valuable to independently evaluate the existence of a right to water in 
customary international law. A treaty-based right to water, whether express 
or implied, is only enforceable against states that are party to the treaty in 
question. A right to water that is predicated in customary international law, 
in contrast, would be binding on all states, save for persistent objectors.
99
This is particularly pertinent if we consider that the ICESCR, arguably the 
most compelling treaty from which water can be asserted as a right, has not 
attained universal signature and ratification by states.
100
Further, even where 
a treaty norm and a CIL norm have exactly the same content, both create 
independent obligations for states.
101
Like a treaty-based right, a CIL right would have potential application 
both between states and within states. Between states, a CIL norm could 
potentially trigger state liability for breaches of conduct.
102 Within states, a 
CIL norm may also have an immediate impact, as a number of national 
constitutions follow a monist approach and automatically domesticate 
international customs, even as new customs are formed, into binding 
national law—without the need for additional legislation.
103
Consider river damming, a common infrastructure project that has 
potentially adverse effects upon water access for downstream riparian states 
and their populations.
104
Asserting the existence of a CIL right to water 
would, theoretically at least, place obligations upon upstream riparian states, 
even where such states may have entered into bilateral or multilateral
treaties concerning water resources to the contrary.
A CIL right to water would also have particular significance in the 
context of investor-state arbitration, where foreign investors sue states, often 
98. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 
38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
99. The persistent objector rule provides that a state that persistently objects to a rule of 
customary international law during the formative stages of that rule will not be bound by that 
rule when it comes into existence for as long as it consistently maintains its objection. See
Olufemi Elias, Persistent Objector, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012); Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of 
Its Sixty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/70/10, at ¶ 59 n.75 (2015) (defining “persistent 
objector”).
100. Treaties: Status of Ratification, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER (2014), http://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
101. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 175 (June 26).
102. G.A. Res. 62/61, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Jan. 8, 
2008).
103. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION, 1994, § 211 (Malawi); CONSTITUTION, 1996, § 322, (S. 
Afr.); CONSTITUTION, 2010, art. 2(5) (Kenya); CONSTITUTION 1990, art. 144 (Namibia); 
GRUNDGESETZ [BASIC LAW], art. 25 (Ger.), translation at https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf.
104. See Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 88 
(Sept. 25).  
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under bilateral investment treaties. Investor-state arbitrations have proven to 
be fertile ground for human rights arguments in the context of water-related 
investments of significant public interest that have direct impacts upon 
water access for local populations, including concessional contracts for 
privatized water provision.
A prominent illustration is the Biwater v. Tanzania arbitration before 
the ICSID Tribunal.
105
After Tanzania privatized public services and 
utilities, including water, it entered into a ten-year contract with a private 
entity that was partly owned by Biwater Group, a British water company.
106
After Biwater failed to deliver on its contractual obligations, Tanzania 
terminated the contract and took control of various Biwater assets. Biwater 
brought ICSID claims against Tanzania for unlawful expropriation of 
property and for failure to provide the company with fair and equitable 
treatment.
107
During the arbitration proceedings, Tanzania argued that, by 
failing to provide the contracted water provision, Biwater had created “a 
real threat to public health and welfare”—though it did not go so far as to 
describe water as a human right.
108
However, non-governmental 
organizations that were amici curiae before the Tribunal submitted 
arguments rooted in the characterization of water as a human right under 
General Comment 15.
109
Unfortunately, the Tribunal failed to address the 
existence of a treaty-based human right to water argument directly.
110
While similar right to water arguments have been raised in other 
investor-state dispute proceedings concerning water,
111
a study by
international water law scholar Tamar Meshel—reviewing investor-state 
arbitrations that have involved a right to water defense—revealed that 
arbitral tribunals have largely refrained from directly addressing the right to 
water’s potential effects on the investment protection obligations of states.
112
105. Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 
Award (July 24, 2008).
106. See Tamar Meshel, Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration: The Human Right 
to Water and Beyond, 6 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 277, 290 (2015).
107. Biwater Gauff, Award, ¶ 95.
108. Id., ¶ 436.
109. Id.
110. See id.; see also Meshel, supra note 106, at 291 (noting the structural barriers in the 
wording of arbitration agreements that hinder reliance upon human rights arguments in 
investor-state arbitrations). 
111. See, e.g., Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal SA v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award (Aug. 20, 2007); Suez, Sociedad 
General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua SA v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010); Suez, 
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and Vivendi Universal SA v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010). 
112. See Meshel, supra 106, at 294; see also Emma Truswell, Thirst for Profit: Water 
Privatization, Investment Law and a Human Right to Water, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT 
TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 570 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011).
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In those arbitrations where right to water arguments were raised, they were
not explicitly asserted as rooted in CIL obligations.
113
Nevertheless, Kate 
Parlett developed a persuasive argument that circumstances exist where an 
investor might seek to rely on CIL as the basis of a claim for breach of an 
obligation under an investment treaty or contract,
114
depending on the 
language of a given arbitration agreement.
This proposition invites one to interpret and apply a state’s investment 
treaty obligations in light of obligations imposed by article 31(3)(c) of the 
VCLT, itself a CIL rule.
115
Article 31(3)(c) is also known as the principle of 
systemic integration or harmonious interpretation.
116
In this context, its 
application follows from the view that states “may rely on human rights 
obligations they owe to non-parties to the arbitration proceedings, such as 
individuals or groups under their jurisdiction, as a defence to investors’ 
allegations of investment protection violations.”
117
Finally, there remains potential for a CIL right to water to attain the 
status of an obligation erga omnes, which are obligations of states towards 
the international community as a whole, that concern all states, and the 
protection of which is a legal interest of all states.
118
Drawing from the ICJ’s 
obiter dictum in Barcelona Traction,119 obligations erga omnes would derive 
from sources that include “principles and rules concerning the basic rights 
of the human person.”
120
Indeed, access to water at the basic level of human 
sustenance and dignity is indispensable to maintaining such a basic right to 
life of the human person.
113. Id.
114. Kate Parlett, Claims Under Customary International Law in ICSID Arbitration,
31 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 434 (2016).
115. For authorities affirming the status of articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT as customary 
international law, see Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. Rep. 
1, ¶ 41 (Aug. 31); Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 1996 
I.C.J. Rep. 23, ¶ 23 (Dec. 12); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), 1999 I.C.J. 
Rep. 1045, ¶ 18 (May 29); RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 12 (2008); MARK 
VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A STUDY OF THEIR
INTERACTIONS AND INTERRELATIONS WITH SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE 1969 VIENNA 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 484–506 (1985).
116. Adamantia Rachovitsa, The Principle of Systemic Integration in Human Rights 
Law, 66 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 557 (2017); Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic 
Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 279 
(2005).
117. Meshel, supra note 106, at 280. 
118. See generally MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES (2000).
119. Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 
I.C.J. Rep. 3, 33–34 (July 24).
120. For a discussion of the meaning of “basic rights of the human person,” see
RAGAZZI, supra note 118, at 136–45 (2000).
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As such, in light of the potential relevance of a CIL right to water, the 
possible existence of such a right is assessed below.
B. Evaluating the Right to Water in CIL Discourse
The CESCR’s adoption of General Comment 15, described above, 
resulted in significant debate over the existence of a right to water under 
CIL. The discourse and literature further increased after 2010 UNGA 
Resolution 64/292 explicitly recognized the right to water.
121
Before offering 
an assessment on the existence of a CIL right to water, this section provides 
an indicative summation of some of the most prominent recent scholarly 
positions on the question.
The existence of a custom of international law requires both opinio juris 
and state practice.
122
Scholars evaluating a customary right to water reach 
different conclusions about the existence of either: Daphina Misiedjan 
argues that the right to water “is still materialising in customary law[,] as it 
currently has a weak status, which is mostly fuelled by state practice in 
combination with states’ statements.”
123
Mary Arden, Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom, only tangentially mentions the possibility of 
a right based in CIL in her review of the potential for a right to water.
124
Stephen McCaffrey finds that despite the sufficiency of opinio juris, no 
right to water has emerged because the right has not been recognized “by an 
authoritative and generally recognized source, such as the International 
Court of Justice, or by states generally,” and given that “some states that 
play important roles in the international system have yet to accept the 
existence of the right.”
125
In contrast, Jimena Chávarro finds that there is sufficient evidence of 
both state practice and opinio juris to conclude that the right to water is an 
independent CIL right.
126
Likewise, Rebecca Bates has advanced the idea 
that “[t]he right to water is a principle capable of being recognized as a 
principle of customary international law.”
127
Rhett Larson states that
121. G.A. Res. 64/292, supra note 80.  
122. ICJ Statute art. 38(1)(b).
123. DAPHINA MISIEDJAN, TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER:
SUPPORTING VULNERABLE PEOPLE AND PROTECTING WATER RESOURCES 73 (2019).
124. Mary Arden, J., Water for All? Developing a Human Right to Water in National 
and International Law, 65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 771, 786 (2016).
125. Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Human Right to Water: A False Promise?, 47 U. PAC.
L. REV. 231–32 (2016). McCaffrey’s centralization of some states as more important in 
international law is problematic as it risks what Balakrishnan Rajagopal terms the hegemonic 
nature of human rights discourse in international law. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Counter-
Hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and Development as a Third World 
Strategy, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 767 (2006). 
126. Chávarro, supra note 16, at 115–24.
127. Rebecca Bates, The Road to the Well: An Evaluation of the Customary Right to 
Water, 19 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 282, 293 (2011).
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[c]onsidering the evolution of State practice, national and 
international jurisprudence, and the activities of several 
international bodies, it is possible to affirm that at least the core 
content of the human right to water—that is, the right of everyone 
to access to water necessary to respond to his/her basic needs—,
has achieved the status of a customary international norm.
128
Finally, Pierre Thielbörger’s 2015 study, which applies a reflective 
equilibrium approach to CIL and is discussed more below, has also found 
that the right to water has achieved the status of a norm or custom.
129
Because the existing literature reaches varying conclusions on water as 
a human right, what follows is a consideration of whether there is sufficient 
evidence to qualify the right as a CIL norm.
1. State Practice
The state practice element of CIL requires the existence of largely 
uniform, or consistent, general practice that subsists over a certain 
duration.
130
To assess state practice for the purpose of identifying a rule of 
CIL, it is appropriate to look to, non-exhaustively, states’ internal laws, 
municipal court decisions, the practice of their executive branches, their 
diplomatic practice, and their treaty practice.
131
Consistency requires near identical state behavior, though minor 
divergences do not undermine consistency but are rather regarded as 
violations of the general rule.
132
Yet state practice concerning the right to 
128. Rhett Larson, The New Right in Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2208 
(2013) (citing Sara De Vido, The Right to Water as an International Custom: The 
Implications in Climate Change Adaptation Measures, 6 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 221, 
224–25 (2012)). The pre-2010 scholarship is largely of the view that no CIL right to water had 
yet evolved. Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a 
Human Right and the Duties and Obligations It Creates, 4 NW. J. INT’L HUMAN RTS. 331, 
340, 345 (2005) (“Although global recognition of this need is increasing, it has not reached 
the level of customary international law as a separate right.”); Melina Williams, Privatization 
and the Human Right to Water: Challenges for the New Century, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 469, 
502 (2007) (citing DAVID BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 15 (2001)) 
(arguing that while there may be increasing state recognition of the right to water, one 
indication that the right was not yet customary international law was exactly what made the 
right so pressing: Many governments failed to ensure access to all citizens, and because 
generalized state practice is a necessary element of customary international law, the failure of 
state practice impedes the development of customary international law).
129. Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 239.
130. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 
(2012).
131. Int’l Law Comm’n, Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law: 
Elements in the Previous Work of the International Law Commission That Could be 
Particularly Relevant to the Topic, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/659 (Mar. 14, 2013) [hereinafter ILC, 
Formation and Evidence of CIL in the Previous Work of the ILC].
132. WINKLER, supra note 41, at 67.
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water evinces a mixed approach in the actual behavior of states: While some 
states provide water as a human right, other states behave as though there is 
no such right. The latter states may engage in widespread water 
disconnections and have prevailing disparities in water provision amongst 
members of the public.
133
They may also fail to regulate industrial water use 
effectively, resulting in the pollution of the water sources that others depend 
on, or discriminatorily deprive water to people living in certain regions.
134
On the other hand, an increasing number of states have inserted a right 





The inclusion of the right to water in state law has the potential to indicate 
state practice, “assuming that states . . . fulfil this self-proscribed legal 
commitment later on in their corresponding policies.”
137
Catarina de 
Albuquerque, “Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking 
water and sanitation,” has identified “good practices” of different states, 
such as Kenya’s water reforms and Egypt’s water loan system, that may 
suggest that these states consider water to be a right.
138
Additionally, one can point to the now superseded Millennium 
Development Goals (“MDGs”), specifically MDG 7C, which aimed to 
halve the proportion of the global population without sustainable access to 
safe drinking water by 2015, as evidence of international recognition of the 
right. This target was met by the international community in 2010.
139
Today, 
the MDGs’ successor, the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”), 
133. Id., at 68–72 (providing a fuller exposition on state practice as an element of CIL). 
134. Id. at 68.
135. National constitution provisions that have an explicit enforceable right to water (as 
opposed to water as an unenforceable principle of state policy for example) include: 
CONSTITUTION, 1996, § 27(a)(b) (S. Afr.); CONSTITUTION, 2010, art. 43(1)(d) (Kenya); 
CONSTITUTION, 2013, § 77a (Zimbabwe). In 2004, the Republic of Uruguay constitutionalized 
access to potable water as a human right by referendum. See CONSTITUTION, 1967, art. 47 
(amended in 2004) (Uruguay). Most recently, the Republic of Slovenia has taken the step of 
amending its Constitution to include a right to drinking water in article 70a. See Constitutional 
Act Amending Chapter III of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (Nov. 25, 2016) 
(Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia No. 75/16). For a discussion of the European 
position on the right to water, see PIERRE THIELBÖRGER, THE RIGHT(S) TO WATER: THE 
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE OF A UNIQUE HUMAN RIGHT 9 (2014).
136. For example, section 3(a) and (b) of Namibia’s Water Resource Management Act 
of 2013 (Act No. 11 of 2013).
137. Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 239. 
138. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human 
Rights Obligations Related to Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Catarina de 
Albuquerque, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/31 (June 29, 2010); see also THIELBÖRGER, supra note 
135, at 9.
139. UNITED NATIONS, UN Millennium Development Goals, Goal 7: Ensure 
Environmental Sustainability, https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2020).
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are of greater relevance.
140
SDG 6, in particular, “seeks to ensure availability 
and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all,” with the 
specific target of achieving universal and equitable access to safe and 
affordable drinking water for all by 2030.
141
Whether the 2030 objective will 
be achieved by states is patently a futuristic determination, but the 
commitment alone, while non-binding, would support the notion that states 
are actively pursuing water access for all.
One can arguably also invoke the existence of official multilateral 
instruments, such as declarations and resolutions, to substantiate the 
existence of state practice. However, to avoid what scholars Bruno Simma 
and Philip Alston cautioned against as “the tendency to ‘count’ the 
articulation of a rule twice, so to speak, not only as an expression of opinio
juris but also as State practice itself,”142 official state documents such as 
UNGA resolutions will only be considered herein as evidence of opinio
juris, below.
On balance, the evidence considered here, in agreement with the more 
rigorous scholarly assessments of the element,
143
suggests that existing state 
practice remains insufficient to uphold a CIL right to water given the limited 
actual behavior of states in support of that right.
2. Opinio Juris
The second element of CIL is opinio iuris sive necessitates, which only 
permits state practice to be regarded as evidence of an international norm 
where states perceive a legal obligation for following the norm that
distinguishes it from mere usage.
144
Sources that can be invoked as evidence 
of opinio juris include public statements made on behalf of states, official 
publications, government legal opinions, diplomatic correspondences, 
decisions of state courts, treaty provisions, and conduct in connection with 
resolutions adopted by an international organization or at an 
intergovernmental conference.
145
Thus, while UNGA resolutions, unlike UN 
Security Council resolutions, do not attract the binding force of law, they 
140. UNITED NATIONS, UN Sustainable Development Goals, Transforming Our World: 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/
post2015/transformingourworld (last visited Apr. 6, 2020); Inga Winkler & Carmel Williams, 
The Sustainable Development Goals and Human Rights: A Critical Early Review, 21 INT’L J.
HUM. RTS. 1023 (2017). 
141. UNITED NATIONS, UN Sustainable Development Goals, Goal 6: Ensure Access to 
Water and Sanitation for All, https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/water-and-
sanitation (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
142. Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus 
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 82, 96 (1988).
143. Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 239; WINKLER, supra note 41, at 69.
144. ILC, Formation and Evidence of CIL in the Previous Work of the ILC, supra note 
131.
145. Id.
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may retain normative value in establishing the existence of a rule or the 
emergence of opinio juris.146 The following assessment, reviewing the 
plethora of multilateral declarations, resolutions, and other state-centric 
documents to that effect, reveals a strong basis for the existence of the 
opinio juris supporting a right to water, which is a view almost unanimously 
held by scholars who have considered the right to water to be a CIL norm.
147
Opinio juris supporting a CIL right to water has been developing since 
the 1977 UN Conference on Water in the Argentinian city of Mar del Plata, 
where the Conference reported that: “All peoples . . . have the right to have 
access to drinking water in quantities and of a quality equal to their basic 
needs.”
148
More recently, the General Assembly asserted the right to water 
in the 2010 UNGA Resolution 64/292.
149
It is important to closely critique Resolution 64/292 given not only its 
probative value but also the significant weight that scholars attach to it in 
examining a CIL right to water. The material language in UNGA Resolution 
64/292 “recognizes” that “the right to safe and clean drinking water and 
sanitation is a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and 
all human rights.”
150
This language (“recognizes” as opposed to “declares”) 
clarifies that the UNGA does not lay claim to discovering the right to water 
but only affirms its existence.
151
146. See Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 
1965, Advisory Opinion, 2019 I.C.J. 169, ¶ 155 (Feb. 25) [hereinafter ICJ Advisory Opinion 
on the Chagos Archipelago]; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 70 (July 8) [hereinafter ICJ Opinion on the Legality of the Use or 
Threat of Nuclear Weapons]. For a comprehensive discussion of UN General Assembly 
[“UNGA”] resolutions and their legal effects, see Marko Öberg, The Legal Effects of 
Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the 
ICJ, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 879, 879–905 (2005); Cedric Ryngaert & Duco Siccama, 
Ascertaining Customary International Law: An Inquiry Into the Methods Used by Domestic 
Courts, 65 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 10 (2018) (noting that the ICJ has the habit of regarding 
non-binding instruments such as UNGA resolutions as, under some circumstances, reflecting 
CIL, without much analysis of its own).
147. For a historical account of the evolution of the right to water since the 1970s, see
SALMAN M.A. SALMAN & SIOBHAN MCLNERNEY-LANKFORD, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO 
WATER: LEGAL AND POLICY DIMENSIONS 7 (2004), and for a historical overview of the 
conferences, declarations, and resolutions on water since 1977, see WORLD WATER COUNCIL, 
History, http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/en/history (last visited Apr. 6, 2020); WINKLER, 
supra note 41, at 79–87; Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 240; Christy Clark, Of What Use Is a 
Deradicalized Human Right to Water?, 17 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 231, 242 (2017) (critiquing 
social movements for water rights in relation to water as an economic good). 
148. UN Water Conference, Report of the United Nations Water Conference, Mar del
Plata, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.70/29, at 66 (1977).
149. G.A. Res. 64/292, supra note 80.
150. Id. ¶ 1. 
151. See THIELBÖRGER, supra note 137, at 79–81 (stating that the word “declares” was 
at the eleventh hour replaced with “recognizes,” which to him suggests that the drafters 
acknowledged that a UNGA resolution could not “declare” a new right due to its non-binding 
nature, but could at most “recognize” an already existing right).
480 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 41:455
One hundred and twenty-two states voted in favor of the Resolution 
with no states voting against; forty-one states abstained and twenty-nine 
states were absent.
152
While no objections were recorded, this high number 
of abstentions and absenteeism casts doubt over the assertion that the 
Resolution reflects a shared opinio juris.153 To reflect opinio juris,
multilateral declarations ordinarily require proof of consensus through a 
higher number of positive votes.
154
In its advisory opinion in Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, for example, the ICJ determined that 
specific UNGA resolutions fell short of establishing the existence of an 
opinio juris on the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons, considering the 
“substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions.”
155
Still, the ICJ noted that UNGA resolutions “may sometimes have 
normative value. . . . provid[ing] evidence important for establishing the 
existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris,” and necessitating a 
“look at its content and the conditions of its adoption.”
156
The 2010 UNGA 




both of which recalled and effectively reaffirmed the 2010 





that also reaffirmed the 2010 UNGA 
Resolution. When considered in isolation, each of these UNHRC resolutions 
would be of limited weight as evidence of shared opinio juris on the right to 
water, as only 47 states are members of the UNHRC at any given time 
whereas the UN membership is at 193 states.
161
Nonetheless, collectively, 
152. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Resolution 
Recognizing Access to Clean Water, Sanitation as Human Right, by Recorded Vote of 122 in 
Favour, None Against, 41 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release GA/10967 (July 28, 2010). For an 
elaborate discussion of the context of the vote and its (in)significance, see WINKLER, supra
note 41, at 76–79; Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 241; Tully, supra note 70.
153. Clark states that the reason for the considerably high number of abstentions is 
because of the politics underlying the introduction of the resolution, which was sponsored by 
Bolivia. Clark, supra note 147, at 244–45. Some states held the belief that it would have been 
more appropriate to wait for the UN HRC to complete its formal development of a substantive 
interpretation of the right. Id.
154. THIELBÖRGER, supra note 137, at 80. 
155. ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, at 
71.
156. Id., at 70.
157. G.A. Res. 68/157, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/68/157 (Dec. 18, 2013) (adopted without a vote).
158. G.A. Res. 70/169, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation (Dec. 17, 2015).
159. Human Rights Council Res. 15/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/9, ¶ 3 (Sep. 30, 
2013).
160. Human Rights Council Res. 16/2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/2, ¶ 1 (Mar. 24, 
2011).
161. See generally Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 241 (explaining the U.N. HRC’s
Resolution in greater detail). 
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there exists a sufficient amount of opinio juris to make a case for the CIL 
right to water.
C. Evaluating the Presence of CIL in Light of Methodological Theories
In light of the finding in section A that there is limited state practice 
supporting a CIL right to water, can one credibly assert the existence of 
water as a customary rule? Scholars claiming that CIL is nevertheless 
present rely on different methods for determining how the two CIL elements 
interact to crystallize into norms of custom than those who conclude it is not 
present. A consistent method, particularly at the ICJ level, to facilitate legal 
certainty has thus far proved elusive.
162
For instance, Stephan Talmon’s 
landmark study on the methodology for determining rules of CIL found that 
the ICJ has not used one single methodology but rather a mixture of 
methodologies: induction, deduction and, the main method, assertion.
163
While this paper is not specifically concerned with the abstract question of 
how CIL should be identified, the question of methodology is unavoidable 
in determining whether the right to water is a CIL norm.
The importance of applying a cogent, clear, and rigorous legal 
methodology for identifying CIL is aptly summed up by Theodor Meron, 
who cautions against the “tendencies, apparent in various fields of 
international law, to impose treaty norms on non-parties in the guise of 
general international law or customary law, even in the absence of state 
practice dehors the treaty.”
164
This, Meron laments, risks the “credibility of 
international human rights,” thereby requiring that consistent and 
“irreproachable” legal methods be utilized when attempting to “extend the 
universality” of international human rights norms.
165
With this caution in mind, this article considers two approaches to 
determining whether a CIL right to water has crystallized: the sliding scale 
and reflective equilibrium approaches. While these two approaches are not 
the only approaches that have been developed in the identification of CIL,
166
162. Nadia Banteka, A Theory of Constructive Interpretation for Customary 
International Law Identification, 39 MICH. J. INT’L L. 301, 302 (2018).
163. Stephan Talmon, Determining Customary International Law: The ICJ’s
Methodology Between Induction, Deduction and Assertion, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 417 (2015). 
Concisely put, induction is a method of inferring the customary norm from an iterative 
process of state practice and opinio juris. Deduction infers a specific customary norm from a 
more general principle. Assertion means that the ICJ neither uses inductive nor deductive 
reasoning, but simply asserts a norm as customary international law. Id.; see also Stephen 
Choi & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law: How Do Courts Do It?, in CUSTOM’S
FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 117 (Curtis Bradley ed., 2016).
164. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY 
LAW 81 (1989).
165. Id.
166. Compare, for example, the constructive interpretation theory advanced by Nadia 
Banteka, which invokes the Dworkinian constructive interpretation approach; not viewing the 
482 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 41:455
they are both especially applicable to the case at hand, as they were each 
developed to test the presence of CIL when one CIL element is lopsided in 
relation to another.
1. Kirgis’s Sliding Scale Approach
In assessing the existence of CIL norms generally, significant 
discrepancies between the existence of state practice and opinio juris are 
often revealed. In a prominent example from 1986, the ICJ in Nicaragua
was faced with significant evidence of a state practice of state intervention 
in the internal affairs of other states, while at the same time, there existed 
strong and, seemingly opposing, opinio juris supporting an obligation of 
non-intervention. To explain this paradox, Fredrick Kirgis engaged the 
metaphor of a “sliding scale”:
167
One element of custom can compensate for 
the other, weaker element or, in the extreme case, an element can become 
entirely dispensable if the other element is of sufficient strength.
168
Under the sliding scale approach, state practice that is very frequent and 
consistent would establish a CIL rule even “without much (or any) 
affirmative showing of an opinio juris so long as it is not negated by 
evidence of non-normative intent.”
169
Therefore, “[a]s the frequency and 
consistency of the practice decline in any series of cases, a stronger showing 
of an opinio juris is required.”170
Kirgis asserted that at the other end of the scale, “a clearly 
demonstrated opinio juris establishes a customary rule without much (or 
any) affirmative showing that governments are consistently behaving in 
accordance with the asserted rule.”
171
The exact amount of state practice that 
would be a substitute for opinio juris and how clear a showing of opinio 
juris will substitute for consistent behavior depends on “the activity in 
question and on the reasonableness of the asserted customary rule.”
172
Kirgis further found that the more destabilizing or morally distasteful 
the activity—for example, the offensive use of force or the deprivation of 
fundamental human rights—the more readily international decision makers 
will substitute one element for the other, provided that the asserted rule 
seems reasonable.
two elements of CIL as strictly divided into a binary, but instead viewing them as interwoven.
The goal of constructive interpretation is to impose purpose on a practice in order to put it in 
the best possible light within the constraints of its factual history and shape. Banteka, supra
note 162, at 301.
167. Frederic Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 146 (1987).
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The principal disquiet with the sliding scale approach is that it can 
justify totally dispensing with state practice as a CIL element where strong 
opinio juris exists. Recall that article 38(1)(b) ICJ Statute requires evidence 
of (1) general practice that is (2) accepted as law.
173
Scholars are uneasy 
imagining “customary law without custom,” as Neils Petersen succinctly 
puts it,
174
as this appears to disregard the intrinsic limitations presented by 
the text of article 38(1)(b) “in order to accommodate a desired (and highly 
admirable) policy outcome.”
175
In this context, Blutman cites Kirgis’s CIL 
methodology approach, amongst others, in cautioning against “dubious 
dichotomies in describing the operation of customary norms in order to get 
round the difficulties posed by sophisticated reconciliation theories.”
176
Consequently, many of the “most highly qualified publicists” to invoke the 
language of article 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute also continue to view both elements 
as indispensable for a CIL norm to exist.
177
Nevertheless, even though Kirgis’s approach may be deemed 
antiquated, the ICJ’s approach to CIL continues to place greater weight 
upon opinio juris in identifying CIL than on state practice, and the 2019 
Chagos Archipelago advisory opinion by the ICJ evinces this approach.178In 
the context of the right to water, embracing the sliding scale approach 
would not result in the complete dispensability of the state practice element 
(as some state practice does exist) but would only require the strength of 
opinio juris to compensate for the shortfall in state practice.
2. Thielbörger’s Reflective Equilibrium Approach
The second approach to determining the presence of a CIL norm, 
despite an imbalance between the presence of state practice and of opinio 
juris, is that advanced by Pierre Thielbörger. Thielbörger specifically 
examined the right to water as a CIL norm and found the state practice 
element wanting, while opinio juris is sufficient.179 To overcome the 
insufficiency in state practice, Thielbörger innovatively adopted a “modern” 
approach to establishing CIL. Thielbörger’s approach draws on Anthea 
Roberts’s original distinction between traditional and modern approaches to 
CIL,
180
which argues that, in the context of the ICJ’s jurisprudence, 
173. Simma & Alston, supra note 142, at 83.
174. Niels Petersen, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role of 
State Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 275, 284 (2008). 
175. Id. at 96.
176. László Blutman, Conceptual Confusion and Methodological Deficiencies: Some 
Ways That Theories on Customary International Law Fail, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 529, 548 
(2014). 
177. Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 235. 
178. ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Chagos Archipelago, supra note 146, at 155.
179. Thielbörger, supra note 50.
180. Anthea Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International 
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757 (2001).
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traditional approaches to CIL emphasize general, consistent state practice, 
leaving opinio juris as an inferior second step.181 In contrast, modern
approaches to CIL emphasize opinio juris as the decisive element for 
identifying custom, starting with examining general statements of rules, 
rather than specific state practices, which take a secondary role.
182
In many ways, Thielbörger’s argument for a reflective equilibrium 
approach to CIL is an appeal to lex ferenda (law as it “ought” to be), which 
remains some distance from lex lata (law as it “is”). In order to overcome 
the lack of sufficient, uniform state practice to support a CIL right to water, 
Thielbörger has recourse to Roberts’s theory of reflective equilibrium,
183
a
theory that Roberts in turn developed through the work of John Rawls. 
Succinctly put, under reflective equilibrium “a strong opinio juris would 
become crucial under the condition that state practice is strong enough to 
allow for different interpretations.”
184
However, Thielbörger emphasizes that 
this approach does not mean that state practice is irrelevant to the 
assessment, as would be the case in Kirgis’s sliding scale approach to CIL 
assessed earlier.
185
Reflective equilibrium ultimately allows the existence of strong opinio
juris to compensate for the inconclusive state practice that evinces water as 
a human right.
186
As such, Thielbörger concludes that the right to water has 
attained the status of a CIL norm. However, Thielbörger’s recourse to 
Roberts’s reflective equilibrium approach—notwithstanding its 
innovativeness—till leaves the right to water’s legal basis under CIL 
tenuous at best.
First, it invites the same criticism that applies to the sliding scale 
approach above: It re-interprets and re-shapes the elements of CIL towards a 
particular result.
187
Therefore, an embrace of the reflective equilibrium 
approach would risk perpetuating the critique that CIL “cannot function as a 
legitimate source of substantive legal norms in a decentralized world of 
nations that lacks a broad sense of shared values.”
188
181. Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 235; The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
(Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 101, ¶¶ 77–81 (Feb. 20); Right of Passage over 
Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. Rep. 6, at 42–43 (Apr. 12).
182. Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 235. An example from the ICJ’s jurisprudence is the 
Nicaragua decision, where the ICJ relied heavily on a General Assembly Resolution to 
establish a CIL rule against the use of force and the principle of non-intervention, with limited 
references to state practice. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 14, at 195 (June 26).
183. Roberts, supra note 180, at 779. 
184. Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 238.
185. Kirgis, supra note 168, at 146.
186. Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 238. 
187. Simma & Alston, supra note 142, at 83.
188. Banteka, supra note 162, at 302.
2020] Unmuddying the Waters 485
Second, valuing opinio juris above state practice, such that state 
practice need not be absolute in order for CIL to form, presents the 
normative challenge of alowing the practice of some states to determine 
what is or is not CIL. Framed differently, it manifests hegemony and biases 
based on geographic, economic, and political power. Such an understanding 
of CIL risks regressing to forms of international law-making that were seen 
during the colonial period—when recourse to the practices of only a handful 
of (western) states for the formation of CIL was replete.
189
The latent 
problems that would arise from reinforcing the role of opinio juris while 
downgrading that of state practice are laid bare by scholars George Galindo 
and Cesar Yip when they opine that:
Making customary international law exclusively an expression of a 
certain opinio juris is dangerous in many respects, especially 
because the practice of states can effectively play a role of 
protecting the interests of Third World states against the will of 
Great Powers. But the tendency of international courts to
emphasize the role of opinio juris is even more dangerous when it 
represents the opinion of a single set of judges under the disguise of 
states’ opinio juris.190
Therefore, Thielbörger’s theory of reflective equilibrium is also not an 
irreproachable legal method for identifying the existence of the right to 
water as a CIL norm.
D. The Right to Water as a CIL Norm qua the UDHR?
A road less travelled in the literature is to advance a right to water under 
CIL by drawing on the authority of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“UDHR”), without specifically evaluating state practice or opinio 
juris. In particular, the right to a standard of living adequate for well-being 
in article 25(1) UDHR
191
has been invoked to imply the right to water.
192
The 
normative justifications for implying a right to water under the UDHR 
mirror those advanced under article 11(1) ICESCR, discussed earlier: 
189. George Galindo & Cesar Yip, Customary International Law and the Third World: 
Do Not Step on the Grass, 16 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 251, 254 (2017); Rajagopal, supra note 
125, at 767; see also Tiyanjana Maluwa, Reassessing Aspects of the Contribution of African
States to the Development of International Law Through African Regional Multilateral
Treaties, 41 MICH. J. INT’L L. 327 (2020) (collecting sources considering similar issues in the 
context of both treaty law and custom before evaluating modern African contributions to 
international treaty law).
190. Galindo and Yip, supra note 189, at 261.
191. G.A. Res. 217(III)A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 25 (Dec. 10, 
1948) (“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being 
of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”).
192. Copp, supra note 60, at 252.
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Access to water is fundamental for sustaining life and the minimum that is 
required to participate in social life with dignity.
However, this legal basis for the right to water in CIL depends on the 
assumption that the UDHR en bloc reflects CIL. That premise is untenable, 
despite receiving support internationally. For example, the view that the 
UDHR is CIL has been asserted judicially, by the ICJ
193
and the African 





scholars also consider the UDHR to be automatically binding because it 
represents the consensus of the international community.
196
Yet, while the 
argument for the UDHR’s authority as CIL has support, it is difficult to 
countenance an approach where courts assert the existence of CIL norms by 
broad-brushingly categorizing a non-binding, UNGA declaratory instrument 
as CIL without any meaningful attempt at applying the established elements 
to identify CIL, let alone engaging CIL methodology. And, given the 
significant methodological disagreement the preceding discussion reveals, it 
does not seem likely that the UDHR would be considered CIL under that 
kind of painstaking legal analysis.
In the final analysis, this article has determined that there is no CIL 
right to water. The right remains an idea whose time has not yet come.
197
At 
best, in the CIL context, the rule can be regarded as statu nascendi, an 
emerging rule of custom that is yet to fully crystalize into a CIL norm.
198
Of 
course, the assertion of statu nascendi itself assumes that the effluxion of 
time will necessarily see the CIL norm’s “crystallization” rather than “de-
crystallization.” This seems to be a fair assumption, as there is 
overwhelming state consensus of a right to water as a matter of opinio juris.
This consensus is not insignificant; the non-binding documents conveying 
this consensus can serve as meaningful resources in interpreting and 
determining the normative content of a treaty-based right to water.
193. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. 
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 42 (May 24); Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Preliminary 
Objections, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 63 (Guggenheim, ad hoc J., dissenting); South West Africa 
Cases (Eth. v. South Africa; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objections, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 319, 
at 379 (Bustamente, J, separate opinion).
194. Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. United Republic of Tanzania, No. 012/2015, Decision, 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ¶ 76 (Mar. 22, 2018). 
195. U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Rep. on the Human. Rights, Situation in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran by the Special Representative of the Comm’n, Reynaldo Galindo 
Pohl, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/23, ¶ 22 (Jan. 28, 1987).
196. Louis Sohn, The Human Rights Law of the Charter, 12 TEX. INT’L L.J. 129, 133 
(1977); Simma & Alston, supra note 142, at 90. 
197. Another potential method for establishing a right to water under CIL is to establish 
the CIL nature of the right to life from which the right to water can be derived. However, this 
argument is unlikely to hold as there is limited state practice or opinio juris to support the 
proposition of life as a CIL norm.
198. WINKLER, supra note 41, at 97. 
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IV. The Significance of General Principles of Law in the 
Right to Water Debate
The third of the three principal sources of international law under article 
38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute
199
is “the general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations.”
200
This source, too, may arguably be of relevance to 
water’s status as a legally binding human right.
201
General principles of law, 
like CIL and treaties, can function as a direct source of rights and 
obligations.
202
It is widely accepted that general principles of law, like CIL, 
would bind all states. In fact, there is no indication of any a priori hierarchy 
among the three formal sources listed in article 38(1).
203
Nevertheless, some 
scholars claim that general principles of law constitute a “secondary” source 
with the main function of “filling gaps”
204
in the absence of a treaty or CIL 
norm.
205
Partly given their unwritten character, the determination of general 
principles of law remains a controversy in international law. Whether 
general principles may be drawn from a comparison of domestic law, 
international law, or global legal systems,
206
and what the methodology for 
defining a general principle should be, is contested.
207
This article adopts the 
199. ICJ Statute art. 38(1). For a comprehensive assessment and characterization of the 
key controversies around general principles of law as a source of international law, see Int’l
Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n in its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. A/72/10, 
at 224 (2017) (Special Representative Marcelo Vásquez-Bermúdez).
200. The vocable “civilized nation” can today be argued to be obsolete, an argument that 
is concisely captured in Judge Ammoun’s separate opinion in North Sea Continental Shelf:
[T]he term ‘civilized nations’ is incompatible with the relevant provisions of the 
United Nations Charter, and the consequence thereof is an ill-advised limitation of 
the notion of the general principles of law. The discrimination between civilized 
nations and uncivilized nations, which was unknown to the founding fathers of 
international law, . . . is the legacy of the period, now passed away, of colonialism.
The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 101, 
133 (Feb. 20) (Fouad Ammoun, J., separate opinion).
201. Felix Ekardt & Anna Hyla, Human Rights, the Right to Food, Legal Philosophy, 
and General Principles of International Law, 103 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS––UND 
SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 221, 227 (2017).
202. Sienho Yee, Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and Applicable Law: Selected Issues in 
Recent Cases, 7 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 472, 488 (2016).
203. CRAWFORD, supra note 130, AT 35 (2012); Sienho Yee, supra note 202, at 488.
204. JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW 
WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 127–29 (2003). 
205. Rumiana Yotova, Challenges in the Identification of the ‘General Principles of 
Law Recognized by Civilized Nations’: The Approach of the International Court, 3 CAN. J.
COMP. & CONTEMP. L. 269, 279 (2017).
206. Catherine Redgwell, General Principles of International Law, in GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW: EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 9 (Stephen Weatherill & 
Stefan Vogenauer eds., 2017).
207. Id. at 15–17.
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widely accepted view advanced by Catherine Redgwell that general 
principles, in the sense of article 381(1)(c), may be derived from both
domestic law and international law.
208
Simma and Alston advocate for a greater grounding of the legality of 
human rights norms in general principles of law.
209
This view has also been 
supported by the ICJ in the South West Africa cases, where Justice Tanaka, 
in his dissent, found equality and non-discrimination to be fundamental 
human rights norms, stating that “the concept of human rights and of their 
protection is included in the general principles in Article 38(1)(c).”
210
Yet, in 
the right to water discourse, the role of general principles of continues to 
receive sparse consideration.
Finding a right to water in general principles would ensure the right has 
a strong grounding in the “consensualist conception” of international law,
211
with significant implications on at least two fronts. First, as a general 
principle of law, the right to water would be binding upon all states and not 
just treaty-contracting States Parties. Second, even if the right to water is not 
itself a general principle, existing general principles may be invoked to 
scope out the normative content of a right to water that is established under 
domestic law (such as a constitution), under treaty law, or under CIL.
In assessing the existence of the right to water as a general principle of 
law, it indeed is significant that some states have incorporated a right to 
water in their national constitutions.
212
However, as argued in the earlier 
assessment of the state practice element of CIL, and as reflected in the 
preponderance of scholarship on the issue, the number of states is not 
sufficiently widespread and the practice not sufficiently common to the 
208. Redgwell, supra note 206, at 10. Joost Pauwelyn also identified four non-watertight 
categories of general principles: First, “meta-principles,” which are the “rules of law that have
an inherent and necessary validity, in whose absence no system of law at all can exist or be 
originated,” as prominently exemplified by the pacta sunt servanda principle. Pauwelyn,
supra note 204, at 125–26. Second, legal principles of municipal legal systems which can be 
validly transposed to international law such as principles on jurisdiction, the burden of proof, 
and res judicata. Id. Third, legal principles of international law which “are produced mainly 
through the process of induction from other positive rules of international law,” such as the 
principle of equality of states. Id. The fourth are the principles of legal logic—“the 
instruments in legal reasoning providing for logical consequences,” such as the lex specialis 
derogat legi generali principle. Id.
209. Simma & Alston, supra note 142, at 105. 
210. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.) Second Phase [1966] 
I.C.J. 250, 298. (Tanaka, J., dissenting).
211. Id.
212. See supra note 135.
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representative legal systems of the world
213
to constitute a general principle 
of law that affirms the right to water.
214
Nevertheless, the lack of a general principle of law supporting the right 
to water does not necessarily mean that general principles are irrelevant to
the debate over whether there is a right to water, which brings us to the 
second reason to assess general principles. General principles could be of 
relevance in defining the content, and determining the obligations that 
attach to, a right to water that is established as a matter of domestic law, 
treaty law, or—assuming such exists—CIL. The right to water’s character 
as a general principle may well be acknowledged and reflected in treaties 
such as the ICESCR or ICCPR. This is particularly pertinent in light of the 
reality that a soft law instrument—General Comment 15—enunciates the 
substance of what the right to water would entail, including its normative 
content,
215
principles of non-discrimination and equality,
216
and the 
correlative general and core obligations of State Parties.
217
However, 
General Comment 15’s soft law, non-binding nature limits reliance upon it, 
given its questionable legitimacy.
General principles of law may thus be utilised to offer universally 
binding law that would define those minimum social standards, particularly 
in terms of the positive and negative obligations of states qua access and 
provision of water as a right. In particular, the general principles of law 
already found in international environmental law would be of potential 
application given the heavily environmentally-laden concerns that water 
access, provision, and security would give rise to. For instance, the 
precautionary principle, would, in the water context, impose obligations of 




Access to water will no doubt remain one of the most vexing global 
concerns in the decades to come. From the 2.1 billion people who lack 
access to safely managed drinking water services, to those whose water 
sources will be increasingly precarious due to the effects of climate change, 
pollution, and industrial over-abstraction, the consequences are potentially 
213. Redgwell, supra note 206, at 15.
214. WINKLER, supra note 41, at 93; KNUT BOURQUAIN, FRESHWATER ACCESS FROM A 
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE, A CHALLENGE TO INTERNATIONAL WATER AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 191 (2008); THIELBÖRGER, supra note 135, at 86–87.
215. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment 15: The Right to Water, supra note 5, ¶¶ 10–12.
216. Id. ¶¶ 13–16.
217. Id. ¶¶ 17–29.
218. PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 153 
(2009).  
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life-threatening.
219
In addressing these challenges, multilateralism ought to 
inform global efforts. As such, international law offers potential for 
common norms for states.
This article has thus sought to unmuddy the waters on the status of the 
right to water under international law by evaluating the right’s existence 
under each of the three principal sources of international law. While water’s 
status as an express human right has been affirmed under treaty law, it is 
limited to the context of specific, protected categories of persons such as 
women, children, and the disabled. With the aid of the implied rights 
doctrine, the ICESCR and ICCPR offer a freestanding human right to water 
of general application, but this right is not explicit and may therefore be 
debated. Non-treaty-based sources of a right to water—CIL and the general 
principles of law—could extend the right to water to non-treaty parties. 
However, limited state practice restricts the conception of water as a right 
under CIL, and the fate of the right to water as a CIL norm may remain 
unsettled until the broader controversy around the appropriate methodology 
for identifying CIL is settled. The right to water is also not supported as a 
general principle of law. Nonetheless, an ongoing conversation about how 
general principles of law support a right to water is valuable, as it can assist
the determination of the nature and content of states’ positive and negative 
obligations regarding the minimum social standards qua access and 
provision of water as a human right.
219. Water, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/water (last 
visited May 9, 2019).
